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In this paper, I review some standard approaches to the cases of con-
tingent a priori truths that emerge from Kripke’s (1980) discussion of 
proper names and Kaplan’s (1989) theory of indexicals. In particular, I 
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Kripke’s discussion (1980) of proper names and rigidity resulted in 
some well-known examples of truths that are putatively contingent 
and, nevertheless, can be known a priori by speakers in the appropri-
ate circumstances (contingent a priori truths, or simply “CATs” from 
now on). Since then there has been an intense debate concerning the 
semantic, epistemic and the metaphysical status of these truths. Ka-
plan’s later work on demonstratives (1989) presented some analogous 
examples of this kind of truths, but this time involving demonstratives 
and pure indexicals. Kaplan’s examples also generated a discussion not 
only concerning the epistemic and metaphysical status of these truths, 
but also of the notion of proper contexts of utterances.
Many critics of Kripke tend to focus on the origin of his examples, 
i.e., his theory of proper names and direct reference. Some of them (e.g., 
Dummett (1973) and Hawthorne and Manley (2010)) take Kripke’s ex-
ample as a sort of reductio of the very thesis that names are directly 
referential. Others explain the phenomenon appealing to some natural 
features of language (e.g. Kripke, Kaplan). But the most prevailing line 
of approach is the one in which there is some weakening of the cre-
dentials of Kripke’s cases either as genuinely contingent (Donnellan 
(1977), Evans (1979), Hawthorne (2002)) or as genuinely a priori (e.g., 
Soames (2003, 2005), Salmon (1986), Plantinga (1975)).
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It seems to me that each of these approaches is, in one way or anoth-
er, problematic for different reasons. In this paper I shall concentrate 
on one particular approach outlined by Evans (1979) and taken up by 
Hawthorne (2002). Since this approach is to a degree scale a reaction 
against Donnellan’s ideas on the same issue, I start by reviewing the 
basics of his treatment. As I shall argue, Evans’ approach has some 
serious drawbacks.
1. CATs
Kripke famously advocated a sharp distinction between metaphysical 
and epistemic modalities. He criticized both the thesis that all neces-
sary truths are knowable a priori and the dual thesis that all contin-
gent truths are knowable only a posteriori. Both theses, according to 
him, derive from the confusion between metaphysical and epistemic 
features of propositions (modalities). A proposition is necessary if it 
is true in all possible worlds, and contingent if true at some possible 
world and false at some other possible world. Hence, necessity is a 
metaphysical feature of some propositions. A proposition is a priori if it 
can be known independently of any empirical experience, and a poste-
riori otherwise. Hence, a priority is an epistemic feature of some propo-
sitions. It follows that the pairs a priori/necessary and a posteriori/
contingent are not intensionally equivalent. But are they extensionally 
equivalent? Part of Kripke’s discussion is an attempt to show that, as 
a result of the semantic phenomenon of rigidity together with the fact 
that descriptions might be used to fi x the reference of names without 
thereby becoming their synonym, some contingent truths can be known 
a priori, and some necessary truths can only be known a posteriori. (We 
shall concentrate on the fi rst kind of truths in this paper.) Kripke offers 
two celebrated examples:
i. Standard Meter Bar Case: The term ‘meter’ (which for all purposes 
can be treated as a proper name of a length unit) was historically in-
troduced by a person or group of persons (the “baptizer”) as naming the 
length of a certain standard platinum bar (call it S). Since the length 
of a metal bar varies with time, let us consider ‘t0’ as the exact instant 
in which the term was introduced. The baptizer was in a position to 
know that the following sentence is true without any relevant experi-
ence (i.e., without having to effectively measure the bar):
 (M) The length of S at ‘t0’ is one meter.
(M) is a true identity sentence that can be known a priori. This is so 
because both sides of the identity sentence refer to the same length in 
the actual world (since the name ‘one meter’ was stipulated to refer 
to the same object as ‘the length of S at ‘t0’’). However, ‘one meter’ is 
a rigid designator, which means that it designates the same length in 
all possible worlds, while ‘the length of S at ‘t0’’ is a non-rigid designa-
tor, which means that it might designate different lengths in differ-
 M. Ruffi no, Superfi cially and Deeply Contingent A Priori Truths 249
ent worlds. Hence, although true in the actual world, (M) is false in a 
world in which the bar is not one meter long at ‘t0’. It follows that (M) 
expresses a contingent truth.
ii. Neptune Case: In 1846 the French astronomer Leverrier, after care-
fully studying some small perturbations in the orbit of Uranus, was 
led to believe that there was a new and so far unobserved planet that 
should be the cause of such perturbations, and predicted the future 
position of it. He baptized this planet ‘Neptune’, that is to say, he gave 
the name ‘Neptune’ to the object corresponding to the description ‘the 
celestial body that causes the perturbation in Uranus’ orbit’ (if there is 
actually one such celestial body). Only a couple of days after communi-
cating his research to the Berlin Observatory, Neptune was effectively 
observed with a telescope for the fi rst time. Hence, even before observ-
ing Neptune (and before having decisive evidence that the thing seen 
in the telescope was responsible for the perturbations), Leverrier was 
in an epistemic condition to know the truth of
 Neptune is the planet that causes the perturbation in Uranus’ 
orbit
Actually, since there could be no planet that corresponds to the descrip-
tion (Leverrier himself postulated another planet called ‘Vulcan’ that, 
as it was later discovered, does not exist), this sentence could express 
no proposition at all if Neptune does not exist. Hence, what Leverrier 
really knew a priori was the conditional
 (N) If there is one and only one cause of the perturbation in Ura-
nus’ orbit, then Neptune causes the perturbation in Uranus’ or-
bit.
Leverrier knew (N) a priori in the sense that no empirical experience 
(i.e., astronomical observation) was needed to know that it is true, since 
it came as a result of his original stipulation regarding the name ‘Nep-
tune’. One might thing that a great amount of empirical observation 
was necessary for Leverrier to come to postulate that there is such a 
planet (and hence that the knowledge of (N) cannot be a priori), but 
strictly speaking the experience is not necessary to know (N) but only 
to know that its antecedent (existential claim) is true. The conditional 
as a whole can be known simply as a result of the stipulation.
2. Indexicals
Kaplan (1989) famously distinguishes between two kinds of meanings 
that indexicals have, namely, the character and the content. The con-
tent is the extension (or intension, depending on the perspective) as-
sumed by an indexical in each context of utterance, while the character 
is a rule (or a function) that associates an appropriate extension (or in-
tension) to each context. The content of an indexical might change from 
context to context, but the character remains fi xed, and it is usually 
identifi ed with the meaning that a speaker understands independently 
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of the context of use. (Two occurrences of ‘today’ on two distinct days 
have the same character but two distinct contents.) Kaplan also distin-
guishes the cognitive signifi cance of a sentence containing indexicals 
from the object of thought associated with it. The bearer of cognitive 
signifi cance is the character, while the object of thought is the con-
tent (which is a proposition). Two persons thinking ‘I am here today’ in 
two distinct days are thinking of two distinct propositions (two objects 
of thought), but the cognitive signifi cance of these objects of though, 
which is related to their character, is the same. Since a priori and a 
posteriori are epistemic properties, and since character is the bearer of 
cognitive signifi cance, it is the character that is a priori or a posteriori. 
But contingent and necessary are metaphysical properties of proposi-
tions, and hence are related to the content. Some sentences containing 
pure indexicals have special characters in the sense that they produce 
true propositions in any context of use. Some good examples are:
 I am here now.
 I exist.1
Therefore, one can know in advance that these sentences will express 
something true whenever employed in any context. The character is a 
priori if it yields true contents (propositions) in any context of use; it is 
a posteriori if it yields sometimes true and sometimes false contents. 
Nevertheless, the proposition produced in each context is contingent. 
Something similar happens to some sentences containing demonstra-
tives, e.g.,
 Dthat [the German chancellor in 2016] 
is the German chancellor in 2016
where ‘Dthat’ is an operator introduced by Kaplan that works as a par-
adigm of a demonstrative, only taking as argument a defi nite descrip-
tion instead of a real demonstration. The complex ‘Dthat [the German 
chancellor in 2016]’ is a rigid designator of the object selected by the 
description ‘the German chancellor in 2016’ (which is non-rigid). We 
know a priori (i.e., it will be true in any context of use) that both sides 
of the identity must refer to the same object. But ‘Dthat [the German 
chancellor in 2016]’ is rigid and, hence refers to the same object in all 
possible worlds, while ‘the German chancellor in 2016’ is non-rigid, and 
might refer to distinct objects in distinct possible worlds. Hence, al-
though the sentence yields a true proposition in any context in which it 
is employed, that proposition will be false at some other possible world 
and, hence, is contingent.
1 Actually, this depends on some assumptions on the kind of contexts that are 
admissible. Kaplan only allows what he calls “proper” contexts of utterance, i.e., 
contexts in which the agent of utterance is at the location of the utterance, at the 
time of the utterance and in the possible world of the utterance. Contexts that do not 
have this feature are called “improper”, and need not be considered (in the same way 
that impossible worlds are irrelevant for modal semantics). The restriction to proper 
contexts is not uncontroversial. (See, e.g., Predelli 2005.)
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3. Donnellan’s Criticism
Perhaps the clearest and most infl uential criticism of Kripke’s cases of 
CAT came from Donnellan (1977). This is a little ironic since Donnellan 
himself, along with Kripke, championed the direct reference theory of 
proper names. Donnellan’s line of thought is that (M) and (N) could not 
represent genuine contingencies, i.e., be true in virtue of the way the 
world is. Genuine contingencies could not be known without experience 
and, hence, could not be known a priori. Donnellan fi rst raises a deeper 
(although peripheral) concern as to whether the introduction of names 
by means of descriptions in fact yield, as Kripke claims, rigid designa-
tors. If the name ‘Neptune’ is introduced by means of the description 
‘the cause of the perturbation in the orbit of Uranus’, this might be the 
result of two different processes: one of them is that the description 
is taken as a synonym of the name. The other is that the description 
merely fi xes the referent of the name as being its denotation (if there is 
one). Now Kripke claims that:
i. Names can be introduced in the second way, i.e., with defi nite de-
scriptions playing merely a reference-fi xing role;
ii. It is part of our linguistic practices that most ordinary names are 
introduced in this way.
Donnellan claims that there is no way of deciding whether a name like 
‘Neptune’ was introduced as a rigid designator (as opposed to the syn-
onym of the description ‘the cause of the perturbation in the orbits of 
Uranus’). His claim is based on a standard objection2 against Kripke’s 
so-called modal argument, which explores the fact that a sentence like
 (A) It could be the case that Neptune is not the cause of the per-
turbations in the orbits of Uranus.
is intuitively true. But if ‘Neptune’ were synonymous with ‘the cause 
of the perturbations in the orbits of Uranus’, the sentence that follows 
‘that’ would be a contradiction, and hence (A) would be false. The in-
tuitive reading of (A) as true counts as decisive evidence, according to 
Kripke, that ‘Neptune’ and ‘the cause of the perturbations in the orbits 
of Uranus’ have different modal behaviors and, hence, cannot be taken 
as synonymous. The standard objection is that this conclusion does not 
follow from the fact that (A) is intuitively true. For one can reconcile 
the intuitive truth of (A) with the descriptive nature of the name by 
supposing that proper names are descriptions with a special property, 
namely, that of always taking primary scope. This reading of (A) would 
be made explicit by
 (A*) The cause of the perturbations in the orbits of Uranus is 
such that it could be the case that it is not the cause of the per-
turbations in the orbits of Uranus.
2 Originally made by Dummett (1973: 113–6).
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Hence, Kripke’s conclusion that names and descriptions cannot be 
equivalent would be a non sequitur. According to Donnellan, any ap-
peal to differences in modal behavior of names and defi nite descriptions 
as evidence for the rigidity of the former would be open this standard 
objection (Donnellan call it an “evasion” (1977: 15)), i.e., that a counter-
factual sentence like (A) is not decisive, since considerations of scope 
can always be raised as an alternative account of the intuitive reading.3 
If the intuitive reading of (A) does not count as evidence for the 
rigidity of ‘Neptune’, does anything count? Donnellan thinks that noth-
ing whatsoever at the grammatical level could indicates unequivocally 
that the name is rigid: only the intention of the speaker that intro-
duces the name (in our case, Leverrier) could determine whether it is 
meant to be rigid or descriptive. He concludes that there is no reason to 
suppose that in ordinary language there really are rigid names intro-
duced as part of normal linguistic practices. Only an explicit conven-
tion that a name should be taken as rigid would yield this effect. Hence, 
in the absence of an explicit convention, we could not tell whether rigid 
names are part of language or merely a theoretical possibility. But the 
mere theoretical possibility of rigid names is enough to pose a problem 
since it implies the theoretical possibility of sentences that would ex-
press CATs (like (N)). These considerations are independent from the 
thesis that names are rigid. What is under discussion is whether the 
rigidity of names is incompatible with the thesis that they can be taken 
as equivalent to defi nite descriptions. It is not incompatible, although 
names may be (and in fact are, for Donnellan) directly referential for 
other reasons.
Given that the introduction of rigid names by means of merely ref-
erence-fi xing descriptions is at least a theoretical possibility, does this 
possibility imply the possibility of CATs in any interesting sense? The 
main point of Donnellan’s paper is that it doesn’t. And his argument for 
it starts with a distinction between (i) knowing that a sentence is true 
and (ii) knowing the truth that this sentence expresses. It is essential 
to keep in mind that the putative knowledge that one might have as 
effect of the stipulation, if it is not simply metalinguistic, must be de re. 
This is so because, by hypothesis, ‘Neptune’ is directly referential and, 
therefore, has no descriptive content at all. But is there such knowl-
edge in these cases? Donnellan avoids giving a precise characterization 
of de re knowledge, but offers what he describes as two loose principles, 
two minimal conditions for it. Both principles are not exactly concerned 
with the relation between knower and the object of the knowledge, but 
3 If Dummett is right, a proper name like ‘Neptune’ is always equivalent to a 
defi nite description, and a distinctive feature of names qua descriptions is that they 
always take primary scope (differently from ordinary descriptions, for which there 
might be ambiguity of scope). This feature of the corresponding descriptions would 
simulate the rigidity of proper names. There is hardly any independent evidence 
for this claim and its only motivation seems to be to get around Kripke’s modal 
argument.
 M. Ruffi no, Superfi cially and Deeply Contingent A Priori Truths 253
are rather conditions on the knowledge report. The fi rst principle is 
roughly the following: a true report ‘S knows that n is F’ (formulated in 
an idiolect in which ‘n’ is a name of an object or person and ‘F’ names 
a property) is of de re knowledge only if, in any other idiolect that con-
tains a name ‘m’ for the same object or person and a translation ‘G’ for 
‘F’, the report ‘S knows that m is G’ is also true. (In other words, the 
report is of de re knowledge with respect to some object or person if its 
truth does not depend on the particular name for that object or person.) 
The second principle is the analogue for indexicals: a true report ‘S 
knows that n is F’ (formulated in an idiolect in which ‘n’ is a name of 
an object or person and ‘F’ names a property) is of de re knowledge only 
if one can substitute ‘that’ (demonstrating the same object) or ‘you’ (in 
the presence of the person) for ‘n’ and the new report is also true. Taken 
together, both principles say that de re knowledge of an object requires 
that a true report of it be insensitive to the particular name or indexical 
used to designate it.
Now Donnellan claims that Kripke’s Neptune case fails on the fi rst 
requirement. He imagines a scenario in which there are inhabitants of 
Neptune having, in their idiolect, a different name for it, e.g., ‘Enut-
pen’, and knowing that their planet is responsible for the perturbation 
in Uranus’ orbit. From there they observe Leverrier through a powerful 
telescope (before Leverrier observed Neptune) and see that he makes 
the stipulation that ‘Neptune’ refers to the cause of the perturbation 
in Uranus’ orbits. The report ‘Leverrier knows that Enutpen causes 
the perturbation in Uranus’ orbit’ seems to be intuitively false in their 
idiolect, although the report ‘Leverrier knows that Neptune causes the 
perturbation in Uranus’ orbit’ is true in our idiolect. This is a sign, or so 
Donnellan thinks, that the truth or falsity of the later report depends 
on the particular name involved, and hence it cannot be a report of de 
re knowledge.
Where does the impression that Leverrier does have some sort of 
knowledge in virtue of the stipulation come from? What Leverrier has, 
according to Donnellan, is the merely metalinguistic knowledge that 
a certain sentence (N) is true, but not the knowledge of the truth that 
it expresses. The latter would require some sort of contact (acquain-
tance?) between Leverrier and Neptune, and hence could not be a priori.
Several other philosophers have taken a line of criticism that, 
although differing in the details, retain the spirit of Donnellan’s ap-
proach (i.e., that no a priori knowledge is possible in the Neptune-like 
cases). E.g., Plantinga (1974), Carter (1976), Schiffer (1977), Salmon 
(1986), Soames (2003, 2005).
4. Evans 
Evans (1979) has an almost entirely different approach. He develops 
both a general and a particular strategy to deal with what he describes 
as the “puzzle” represented by CATs. The general strategy is supposed 
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to deal with all forms of CATs. And the particular is meant to deal with 
the specifi c version of it discussed by Kripke and Donnellan. Let us 
look a t the particular solution fi rst. It presupposes an incursion into a 
theory of what Evans calls descriptive names (i.e., names such as ‘Nep-
tune’, whose reference is fi xed by a defi nite description; Evans’ favorite 
example is ‘Julius’, which he introduces as referring to ‘the inventor of 
the zip’). Evans thinks that names like these are rare in ordinary lan-
guage, but some cases do exist (this is an empirical claim), and this is 
enough to generate the puzzle. But, contrary to Kripke and Donnellan, 
he thinks that these names do keep their descriptive content after the 
reference has been fi xed. The main obstacle to this claim is Kripke’s 
modal argument, which is based on the fact that ‘Julius is F’ and ‘the 
inventor of the zip is F’ exhibit different modal behavior, since in ev-
ery possible world ‘Julius is not Julius’ is false, while in some possible 
world ‘Julius did not invent the zip’ is true. (This is just another way of 
saying that ‘Julius’ is rigid, while ‘the inventor of the zip’ is non-rigid.) 
The modal argument presupposes that if two sentences differ in their 
modal behavior, then they must correspond to two different proposi-
tions and, if this is so, they have two different contents. In other words, 
it presupposes that content and proposition is one and the same thing, 
and hence if two sentences correspond to two distinct propositions, they 
cannot have the same cognitive content. But this is something that 
Evans wants to challenge. The same content can correspond to two 
distinct propositions, one of them a necessary truth, and another one 
a contingent truth. He is inspired by examples like the following pair 
of sentences:
  (i) John is as tall as John
 (ii) John is as tall as himself
(i) attributes to John a property that some, but not all, objects have, 
namely, to be as tall as John. But (ii) attributes to John a different 
property, namely, that of being as tall as himself. In symbols, the prop-
erties attributed to John in (i) and (ii) are, respectively,
  (P) λx(x is as tall as John)
 (P’) λx(x is as tall as x)
Thinking of intensions as functions from possible worlds to extensions, 
they correspond to different intensions, since P will select, in each 
world, the class of objects that are as tall as John, while P’ will select, in 
each world, the class that includes the totality of objects in that world. 
Anyway, Evans’ strategy presupposes dissociating differences in the 
modal profi le of expressions such as ‘Julius is F’ and ‘the inventor of the 
zip is F’ from differences in the cognitive content of both: they might 
behave differently in modal terms and, nevertheless, have the same 
cognitive content.
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5. Descriptive names
As Evans’ conceives them, descriptive names are a kind of monster, 
similar to those mythological creatures that result from a forbidden 
relationship between humans and gods. For they result from the equa-
tion of expressions belonging to two entirely different semantic catego-
ries: we have a proper name like ‘Julius’ (with some essential proper-
ties of names, like being referential and being rigid) having its content 
(or Fregean sense) given by a defi nite description (which is neither 
referential nor rigid). Defi nite descriptions, for Evans, are not referen-
tial expressions: they are binary quantifi ers. ‘The inventor of the zip is 
British’ is, according to his suggestion, similar to ‘All inventors of the 
zip are British’, ‘Some inventors of the zip are British’, ‘Most inventors 
of the zip are British’, etc. These can be represented by second-order 
operators that associate pairs of conceptual expressions to truth-val-
ues, i.e., as ‘All(I, B)’, ‘Some(I, B)’ (where I and B abbreviate ‘inventor 
of the zip’ and ‘British’, respectively). By parity, ‘The inventor of the 
zip is British’ has the form ‘The(I, B)’. It follows that ‘Julius’ is actu-
ally equivalent to ‘The (I, X)’, which stands for a second-order operator 
from pairs of concepts into truth-values. So, the Fregean sense of a 
descriptive name in Evans’ conception is not given by another referen-
tial expression (as we would expect), but is the sense of a second order 
operator applied to a conceptual expression. The sense of the name is, 
roughly speaking, a way of presenting its reference as being the unique 
object that satisfi es the description.
The above characterization of ‘Julius’ as a descriptive name involves 
two claims: fi rst that Julius is a referential expression and, second, 
that ‘the inventor of the zip’ (that gives the former its Fregean sense) 
is not a referential expression. To ground that, two questions have to 
be answered:
(i) How do we know that ‘Julius’ is a referential expression? Evans of-
fers two reasons. The fi rst, and most important, is that we can easily 
make ‘Julius’ fi t into a minimal and general theory of reference. (The 
same does not hold for ‘the inventor of the zip’, as we shall see.) A mini-
mal theory of reference (in the sense that it contains all that is neces-
sary and suffi cient to characterize what is essential in reference) for 
names (such as ‘Max Freund’) can be given by the homophonic clause:
 ‘Max Freund’ refers to Max Freund.
Why is this clause enough? Because it gives everything that one should 
expect from any adequate theory of reference, i.e., it can be combined 
with the notion of truth and satisfaction in order to make the following 
principle true:
 If ‘a’ refers to o, and ‘Fa’ is atomic, then ‘Fa’ is true iff o satisfi es ‘F’
In our case,
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 If ‘Max Freund’ refers to Max Freund, and ‘P(Max Freund)’ is 
atomic, then ‘P(Max Freund)’ is true iff Max Freund satisfi es ‘P’.
In other words, no matter what the foundational reasons are for saying 
that Max Freund is the reference of ‘Max Freund’ (e.g., that it corre-
sponds to the intention of someone using the name, or that it is caus-
ally tied to the name, or whichever theory one might have that connects 
Max Freund to ‘Max Freund’), and for saying that Max Freund satisfi es 
‘P’, all that matters for the concept of reference, according to Evans, 
is that is combines properly with the concept of truth and with the 
concept of satisfaction. The second reason is simply an appeal to the 
intuition that ‘Julius’ is used rigidly, i.e., that we normally consider 
sentences like the following as false:
 If you had invented the zip, you would have been Julius.
 If Julius had not invented the zip, he would not have been Julius.
(ii) How do we know that descriptions are not referential expressions? 
Here Evans offers a meta-philosophical argument (which is different 
from Russell’s reasons for not considering descriptions as referential; 
for Russell an expression is not referential if a sentence that contains 
it has truth conditions even under the assumption that the expression 
lacks a reference, which means that a sentence containing a referential 
expression lacks truth conditions if the expression has no reference). 
Assimilating descriptions into the category of referential expressions 
would require making some adjustments in the theory of reference in 
order to leave room for some phenomena that are typical of descrip-
tions, such as their non-rigidity and ambiguity of scope when embed-
ded in sentences containing negation (such as ‘The current king of 
France is not bald’) or modal operators (such as ‘The fi rs man in space 
could have been an American’), or epistemic operators (such as ‘George 
IV wants to know whether Scott is the author of Waverley’). But this 
would introduce a great discontinuity and artifi ciality in the theory 
of reference, since paradigmatic referential expressions (like pronouns 
and ordinary names) never really take up the possibilities left open by 
this new (modifi ed) theory.
6. Free Logics and Descriptive Names
Consider Kripke’s sentence (N) again:
 (N) If there is one and only one cause of the perturbation in Ura-
nus’ orbit, then Neptune causes the perturbation in Uranus’ or-
bit.
In symbols
 (N) x  Fx  (F(n))
‘n’ is supposed to be a name that is rigid and directly referential, and 
that’s why the truth expressed by the sentence is contingent: there 
could be a possible world in which the antecedent is true (i.e., there is 
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one unique cause of the perturbation of Uranus’ orbit) and the conse-
quent false (i.e., Neptune is not the cause of the perturbation in that 
world). If ‘n’ were a description, (N) would be a necessary truth because 
the consequent would be a tautology. However, as Evans notices, (N) 
can only correspond to a proposition if ‘n’ refers. In the absence of a ref-
erence, there is no proposition to be known. And this is so despite the 
fact that, because the name is descriptive, in the absence of a reference 
a sentence containing it might still have a Fregean sense (and, hence, 
can be understood). Some sentences W(n) containing the name ‘n’ can 
be true even if n does not exist (e.g., ‘It is not the case that Julius is F’, 
when there is no inventor of the zip). But, according to classical logic, 
we must be able to apply existential generalization in the ‘n’-position, 
thereby getting x W(x), which might be false. Hence, if one wants to 
claim that (N) yields knowledge, one must not allow as a general rule 
the inference from W(n) to x W(x) unless there is a guarantee that the 
name ‘n’ refers (i.e., that x(x=n)), which means that one must adopt a 
logic that is free of existential assumptions, i.e., one must adopt some 
form of free logic.
 Evans actually suggests something stronger, in the form of two 
theses:
(i) The acceptance of descriptive names requires the acceptance of 
free logics (p. 166)
(ii) The acceptance of free logics requires the existence of descriptive 
names (p. 173)
Both taken together imply that the assumption of free logic and the as-
sumption of descriptive names go together, or so Evans seems to think. 
In other words, either (N) is formulated using a free logic (i.e., without 
the assumption that ‘n’ refers), or there is no clear candidate for the 
corresponding CAT. And being formulated using free logic presuppose 
the existence of descriptive names, i.e., names that are rigid but have 
a descriptive meaning even in the absence of a reference; this makes it 
possible that a sentence containing the name might be understood (i.e., 
have its truth-conditions formulated) even if there is no referent. But, 
as Evans points out, Donnellan is not willing to accept the existence of 
descriptive names in this sense. And this is so for two reasons. First, 
for Donnellan, even if a name has its referent fi xed by a description by 
an explicit convention, the description does not remain attached to the 
name. (In other words, if there is no referent of the name, there is noth-
ing to be understood in a sentence containing the name.) Second, and 
more importantly, the understanding of a name requires, for Donnel-
lan, some sort of contact with its referent, and therefore there cannot 
be such understanding if the name does not refer. Hence, Evans’ fi rst 
point against Donnellan is, as he himself calls it, ad hominen: if (N) is 
to be a candidate for contingent a priori knowledge, then it must not al-
low for existential quantifi cation in the position occupied by the name. 
But if this is so, one must accept free logic. But free logic (at least in 
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Evans’ version of it) requires descriptive names, i.e., names such that 
sentences containing them do not depend on the existence of referents 
to have meaning. Donnellan does not accept such names, and so, ac-
cording to Evans, he should not recognize a puzzle in the fi rst place. 
7. Contingency: Deep and Superfi cial
However deep and ingenious the refl ections on reference and descrip-
tive names are (and whether or not they yield a solution to the puzzle 
generated by CATs), these refl ections turn out to be not strictly neces-
sary for dealing with the puzzle, since there is a second, simpler and 
more general strategy, this time not coming out from a theory of refer-
ence, but from a theory of contingency. Evans introduces a distinction 
between superfi cially and deeply contingent truths. A sentence P is 
superfi cially contingent iff it is false at some possible world, i.e., ‘¬P’ is 
true. And it is deeply contingent if a verifying fact is not guaranteed by 
semantics alone, i.e., by understanding the sentence one is not thereby 
assured that there is a verifying fact that is a “contingent feature of re-
ality” (p. 185). If we can talk of contingency as a sort of requirement for 
truths, superfi cial contingency and deep contingency require different 
things. Superfi cial contingency requires a certain minimal modal pro-
fi le, while deep contingency requires something from the truthmaker, 
i.e., that it is not generated by semantics alone.
Evans claims that the cases presented by Kripke are, at best, only 
superfi cially contingent, since the semantic stipulation gives a guaran-
tee of a verifying fact for (N). (This is also presumably so for Kaplan’s 
cases.) And all cases of superfi cially CATs have the same source. Since 
propositions are true or false at possible words, we might also think of 
them as properties that hold (or do not hold) of possible worlds, or as 
requirements for being true in each possible world. Now a property or 
requirement of this kind might be based on a contingent feature of the 
actual world. In this case, on the one hand it trivially applies to the 
actual world (because it was extracted from it) and, on the other hand, 
it is not a property that all possible worlds have (because it is based on 
a contingency) and hence does not apply trivially to any world. Let C be 
any contingent fact of the actual world (e.g., that the sky is blue), and 
consider the property (P) of possible worlds expressed by
 (P) λw(w includes C iff @ includes C)
(where @ is the actual world). ‘@ includes C’ expresses a necessary 
truth, since in any possible world it will be true that @ includes C. The 
result is that this is a property that not all possible worlds have, but @ 
certainly has. Now consider a different property
 (P*) λw(w includes C iff w includes C)
P and P* correspond to two properties, since the fi rst is false of some 
possible worlds, but the second is true of all of them. However, Evans 
claims that they yield cognitively equivalent propositions when applied 
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to @, since both result in saying that @ includes C iff @ includes C 
(which is not really a new thing to know). Here, again, what is opera-
tive is the distinction between proposition and cognitive content.
This is supposed to be the general strategy for dealing with all cases 
of CATs, and reducing them to things that do not represent substan-
tial, but only trivial, knowledge about the actual world. Better said: it 
reduces them to an attribution of a non-trivial property to the actual 
world that is epistemically equivalent to the attribution of a trivial 
property. How does this general strategy apply to Neptune-like cas-
es (i.e., cases involving descriptive names)? For we saw that the fi rst 
strategy, trading on specifi c features of descriptive names, was actually 
not strictly necessary, since there was something broader and more 
fundamental to solve the problem of CATs in its greater generality. 
Now remember Leverrier’s sentence: 
 (N) If there is one and only one cause of the perturbation in Ura-
nus’ orbit, then Neptune causes the perturbation in Uranus’ or-
bit.
In formal notation:
 (N) x Fx ([n]F(n))
Here ‘[n]’ is the scope indicator of the name ‘n’, and it has the effect of 
not allowing existential quantifi cation in the ‘n” position over (N), but 
only over ‘F(n)’, which is, according to Evans, a necessary condition for 
there being the puzzle of CATs in the fi rst place.4 Let’s rewrite (N) by 
unpacking ‘n’ and using ‘@’ for the actual world. A defi nite description 
must have a position open for the possible world in which it is being 
considered, and ‘n’ has, by convention, its reference fi xed by the de-
scription taken in the actual world. So (N) becomes:
 x Fx (F (the x F(x, @)))
Now if we consider that ‘Fx’ is true or false under an assignment of 
x only in relation to a possible world w, we might rewrite it as a bi-
nary relation ‘F(x,w)’ between objects and possible worlds, and hence 
we have
 x F(x,w) (F (the x F(x, @), w))
We might see this as a property of possible worlds:
 (λw)( x F(x,w) (F (the x F(x, @), w)))
This property requires of a possible world w that, if there is one and 
only one object that is F in w, then the one and only object that is F in 
@ is F in w. This property is not satisfi ed by all possible worlds: it is 
4 If we had
   [n](x Fx (F(n)))
instead, we should allow for existential generalization, i.e.,
   y(x Fx (F(y)),
but this cannot possibly be known a priori, since it involves the existence of an object 
with a contingent property.
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false in those worlds w in which there is one and only one F, but the 
only object that is F in @ is not F in w. If this property is applied to the 
actual world it yields
 !x F(x,@) (F (the x F(x, @), @)))
which says of @ that if there is one and only F in @ then the one and 
only F in @ is a F in @. This has the same content as the application of 
the property 
 (λw)(!x F(x,w) (F (the x F(x, w), w))))
to @, which is a property that absolutely every possible world has (i.e., 
if there is one and only one F in w, then the F in w is a F in w).
We can see the intended effect leaving untouched the defi nite de-
scription. But if we want to follow Evans and treat it as a binary quan-
tifi er, we can rewrite
 W ((the x F(x, w), w)
as
 (Ix)( F(x, w); W(x, w))
 (where ‘(Ix)’ is the binary operator corresponding to ‘The’), and the 
property above becomes
 (λw)(!x F(x,w) (Ix)( F(x, @); F(x, w))
which, applied to the actual world, yields
 !x F(x,@) (Ix)( F(x, @); F(x, @))
This is, according to Evans, epistemically equivalent to the attribution 
to @ of the trivial property
 (λw)(!x F(x,w) (Ix)( F(x, w); F(x, w))
8. Contingency and Existence
An important aspect of Evans’ general strategy is that it does not have 
to appeal to a claim like the following: if a statement is contingent, 
it must be existentially committing and, hence, cannot be a priori at 
all (since matters of existence of ordinary objects are not knowable a 
priori). For the source of contingency is not necessarily related to the 
existence of objects with such and such features. There is a trivial and 
a non-trivial reason for this. The trivial is that there might be CATs 
that do not involve singular terms and, a fortiori, do not require the 
existence of anything to be true. E.g., the following sentence
 All whales are mammals iff all whales are mammals in @.
There is no singular term here, only a universal quantifi er and two con-
ceptual expressions. Hence, its truth does not require the existence of 
any object. The biconditional is knowable a priori, and is contingent (be-
cause the left side of it is true in the actual world but false in some pos-
sible worlds, while right side of it is true in every possible world). The 
non-trivial reason is compressed in an apparently enigmatic passage:
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[I]t does not follow from the fact that a sentence is contingent because it is 
formulated with the use of a referring expression, that its contingency is 
due to the contingent possession of a certain property by the object to which 
the expression refers. (p. 175)
Evans is thinking about a sentence like our
 (N) !x Fx ([n]F(n)).
Now, the fact that it includes a referring expression (which is, there-
fore, rigid) implies that
 (Ν*)◊(!x Φx & ¬[n]Φ(n))  
(If ‘n’ were not a referring expression, (N) would have been a neces-
sary truth since the consequent of the conditional would be a necessary 
truth, and (N*) would be false.) Which means that it is contingent (at 
least superfi cially contingent, in Evans’ sense). But because ‘n’ is taken 
with narrow scope we are not allowed to infer
 (N**) y (!x Fx (F(y)))
which is contingent in virtue of the fact that its truth demands the 
existence of an object with a specifi c property (i.e., the property cor-
responding to 
 λy (!x Fx F(y))).
(N**) could only be derived if the name in (N) had wide scope. So, the 
only existential claim allowed by free logic to follow from (N*) is
 (N***) !x Fx (x F(x))
which is knowable a priori.
In a nutshell: the puzzle requires that (N) is such that:
 (i) It is formulated with a name (referential)
 (ii) The name is descriptive 
 (iii) The name takes narrow scope
For: (i) – if it is not a name but a description that appears in (N), then 
(N) expresses a necessary (and not a contingent) truth; (ii)-if the name 
is not descriptive, the existence or not of a proposition to be known 
would be dependent on a contingency (but, as it seems, a proposition 
cannot depend, for its existence, on a contingency); (iii) – if the name 
takes wide scope, it should be open to existential quantifi cation and, 
hence, the proposition could not be a priori, but only a posteriori. Al-
though (i)–(iii) are necessary and suffi cient conditions for (N) being 
contingent, the latter is not contingent in virtue of the existence of the 
object corresponding to ‘n’. The contingency is (only) a superfi cial one, 
due to the modal profi le of (N), but not due to the existence of an object 
with a particular property in the world since (N) does not require such 
existence to be true.
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9. Some Drawbacks
Evan’s general strategy has some drawbacks. A minor one is that all 
cases envisaged by him involve in one way or another an actuality op-
erator (actually P is true iff P is true in the world that is treated as 
actual) or reference to the actual world, which enables one to create a 
property that is trivially satisfi ed in the actual world (because it uses 
an empirical fact that obtains in the actual world) and not satisfi ed in 
some other world. In the same way that ‘the actual DD’ is a rigidifi ed 
description, ‘actually P’ is necessarily true (if P is true in the actual 
world) or necessarily false (if P is false in the actual world). But refer-
ence must be made to the actual world in the shaping of such proper-
ties; otherwise we do not get the same effect. The strategy was meant 
by Evans to be completely general and not involving aspects belonging 
to a theory of reference. But the actuality operator is an indexical (in-
deed, a pure indexical, according to Kaplan’s terminology), with all the 
properties that indexicals have, including rigidity and direct reference. 
So, the strategy is not, after all, independent from aspects of the theory 
of reference, and not quite as general as Evans might have thought. 
A more serious drawback is that Evans’ strategy relies heavily on 
the distinction between cognitive content and propositions. But this 
distinction is at best highly controversial. For it implies, in talking 
about the cognitive content, eschewing aspects related to modal behav-
ior. This is not clearly reasonable, unless one sees this as anticipating 
(without fully articulating) Kaplan’s later distinction between charac-
ter and content. As we saw, in Kaplan’s (1989) framework, we can ex-
plain away the strangeness of CATs by attributing distinct roles to each 
of these dimensions. The character is a priori (in case all propositional 
contents generated by occurrences of that sentence in any context are 
true propositions) or a posteriori (in case some propositional contents 
generated by that sentence in some contexts are true and some are 
false). And the content is the proposition generated by the character 
in that context, and it is the content that is contingent or necessary, 
according to its modal profi le. If this is so, Evans can be understood as 
holding that all cases of CATs are due to semantic properties of indexi-
cals5, and also that all CATs derived from indexicality are only superfi -
cially contingent. Hence, that there are only superfi cially CATs.6
But what if there are cases of indexical-free CATs? It seems that 
they would have to be treated as deeply contingent in Evans’ sense. 
Williamson (1986) discusses an example that would have this effect. 
At fi rst sight this seems to be an easy task, since sentences like (N) 
contain proper names but appear to contain no indexicals (provided the 
5 Hawthorne (2002: 247) and Soames (2003: 417) seem to agree with Evans on this.
6 Contrary to Evans, Kaplan does not treat characters that always yield true 
contingent propositions in virtue of indexicals as less interesting (or superfi cial) 
than those that do not always yield true propositions. Kaplan draws no distinction 
between superfi cial and deep contingency.
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verb is given a tenseless reading). But this easy alternative would not 
be indexical free because ‘Julius’ has its reference fi xed with the help 
of a defi nite description taken in the actual world, and hence some-
how the actuality operator (which is an indexical) is behind the name. 
(Since he places no restriction, Williamson seems to think that this is 
so for all proper names whose reference is fi xed by descriptions, even 
those that are not descriptive in Evans’ sense; so presumably he is leav-
ing out of the picture names whose reference is fi xed by indexical-free 
description such as ‘the fi rst prime number greater than the cardinal-
ity of the continuum’.)
Here is Williamson’s example:
 There is at least one believer
There is no proper name and no indexical here. The ‘is’ here has to 
be taken in its tenseless reading, for otherwise a temporal indexical 
would be present.7 Presumably one can know a priori (B), for believing 
it (without further empirical evidence) makes it true. And it is contin-
gent, given that there could have been no believers. One might think 
that (B) can only be known by inference from
 (I) I am a believer.
But (I) has the indexical ‘I’, and this would mean that knowledge of 
(B), like knowledge of ‘Julius invented the zip’, is also derivative from 
knowledge concerning indexicality. However, there is another way of 
deriving (B) that does not appeal to (I), namely, by means of the follow-
ing principle:
 (M) If there is a valid deduction of P from the premise that some-
one believes that P, then one is assured in believing P.
(M) is hyperreliable in that any belief acquired by employing it is guar-
anteed to be true. So, if one comes to believe a proposition P by just 
employing (M), that belief is certainly true. On the other hand, if there 
is a valid deduction of P from the premise that one believes P, then no 
empirical evidence at all is needed to know P, just believing it is enough 
to transform that belief into knowledge by using M. There certainly is 
a valid deduction of ‘there is at least one believer’ from the premise 
that ‘someone believes that there is at least one believer’. Representing 
‘There is at least one believer’ formally as $y $ x(B(x, y)) (where ‘B(x,y)’ 
abbreviates the binary relation x believes y), we have the premise
  x(B(x, vtB(t, v)))
from which, by existential generalization, we get
 yx(B(x, y))8
7 One might raise doubts as to whether the effect intended by Williamson (i.e. 
something being made true by someone just believing it) can be obtained by taking 
the verb as tenseless. I will not discuss this issue here.
8 We can skip here some minor complications such as the fact that the fi rst order 
variables have both believers and propositions in the domain, and that the existential 
264 M. Ruffi no, Superfi cially and Deeply Contingent A Priori Truths
and, hence, by (M), one is entitled to believe a priori that there is at 
least one believer. In order to deal with the objection that this might be 
a necessary truth (in case one takes God’s existence to be necessary), 
Williamson proposes the following modifi ed version of (B):
 (B’) There is at least one fallible believer.
Consider the premise that someone believes that there is one fallible 
believer. There are two possibilities for this someone who believes this: 
he or she might be either fallible or infallible. If he or she is infallible, 
then the content believed must be true, and it follows that there is at 
least one fallible believer. If he or she is fallible, then it follows by exis-
tential instantiation that there is at least one fallible believer.
10. Going Deeper on Superfi cial Contingencies
Williamson’s example seems to show that Evans’ thesis that all CATs 
are superfi cially contingent is questionable. But we can go further and 
question whether the distinction between weakly and strongly CATs 
makes sense in the fi rst place. (And, even if it does, we can ask whether 
it can be motivated independently from the fact that it provides a way 
of discrediting CATs or whether it is simply ad hoc.) Evans and some 
of his followers (e.g., Hawthorne (2002)) seem to think that the distinc-
tion is clear enough, and it suffi ces to show that there can be no coher-
ent account of cases of genuine knowledge of deeply CATs.
It is not completely clear why knowledge of weak contingency 
should be less interesting than that of deep contingency. (Especially if 
we adopt a two-dimensional semantics, like Kaplan does, and attribute 
cognitive signifi cance to one of the dimensions.) From the examples 
given by Evans it seems that all cases of superfi cial contingency fol-
low a certain pattern. We can know some superfi cially contingent truth 
about something if we consider a property by reference to this same 
thing. Hence, ‘a has the same size as a’, ‘a has the same color as a’, 
‘a is as old as a’ all state contingent properties of a (in the sense that 
not every object possess the properties that a has). This is no different 
when the actuality operator is used, since it applied in a possible world 
means ‘as it is in this world’. Hence, somehow refl exivity seems to be 
the source of superfi cial contingencies in Evans’ sense, while no refl ex-
ivity is involved in deeply contingent truths that, presumably, cannot 
be a priori for him. (We have seen from Williamson’s example that this 
is probably not true.) But there are different ways of stating a property 
of an object by reference to itself. Some of them yield trivial properties 
of the object, while others yield properties that are not trivial. Evans 
seems to base his general approach on properties of a of the form
 a has the same P as a.
generalization would, strictly speaking, require the previous transformation of the 
existential sentence in the corresponding proposition by means of a that-operator.
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But now consider:
 Hesperus is as large as Hesperus.
 Hesperus is as large as Phosphorus.
Are they both sources of the same property? Or two distinct properties, 
one of them holding trivially of Hesperus? Having Kripke’s example in 
mind, consider
 Paderewski has the same DNA sequence as Paderewski.
Does it state a trivial property of Paderewski or something that one 
might be surprised in discovering (e.g., if one thinks that they are dif-
ferent persons, as in Kripke’s example)? This brings us into the vicin-
ity of Frege’s problem, i.e., the problem of explaining informativeness 
when reference to the same object is made repeatedly. One is not guar-
anteed that by defi ning a property of an object by reference to this same 
object we thereby get something that is trivially known of this object, 
even if reference is done using the same name-type. This might depend 
on there being coordination in language or thought between different 
tokens of names.9
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